# **Antineutrinos in Support of IAEA Safeguards**

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Division of Technical Support Department of Safeguards



#### **Outline**

- Overview of IAEA activities
- Antineutrinos and IAEA safeguards
- The future of Safeguards
- Discussion of roadmap



### **Nuclear Science and Applications**






### **Technical Cooperation**



### **Nuclear Energy**



# **Nuclear Safety and Security**



### **Nuclear Safeguards**



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#### Safeguards Home

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Legal Framework

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#### Department of Safeguards

"Effective IAEA safeguards remains the cornerstone of the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime aimed at stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and moving towards nuclear disarmament." -- Olli Heinonen --

#### Inside Safeguards

#### Statements & Reports

#### Safeguards Implementation

The IAEA annually reports on safeguards implementation to the Agency's Board of Governors. Latest Statement and Background

More Statements... »

#### Symposia & Events

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges, 1-5 November 2010, Vienna, Austria

More Meetings... »

#### Mission & Role

Safeguards System of the IAEA

Organizational Structure

Mission of Divisions

Additional Publications

Safeguards Concepts & Definitions

IAEA Statute

Safeguards Glossary [pdf]

#### Legal Framework

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Safeguards-Related Treaties & Documents

Information Circulars (INFCIRCs)

INFCIRC/153 [pdf]

INFCIRC/540

More... »

#### Safeguards Status

Safeguards Agreements

Additional Protocols


Safeguards Action Plan [pdf]



### **IAEA Safeguards Objectives**

 Safeguards are applied by the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of declarations made by States about the exclusively peaceful use of their nuclear material and activities and thereby reducing the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

# The Nuclear Fuel Cycle





#### Safeguards Implementation

- 237 safeguards agreements in force in 163 States
- 2,036 inspections in 2008
- ~ 250 Safeguards Inspectors
- Limited funding ~ €110M regular budget
- Improving implementation through
  - Additional Protocol
  - Integrated Safeguards (IS) Approach



### The Division of Technical Support

Wide variety of safeguards equipment/techniques:

- Containment and Surveillance (C/S)
  - Containment verification
  - Seals
  - Cameras
- Non Destructive Analysis (NDA)
- Destructive Analysis (DA)
- Environmental Sampling (ES)



### **Non Destructive Assay (NDA)**

#### ~100 different types of NDA equipment :



























# Containment and Surveillance (C/S)

#### Seals


















#### History of antineutrinos and IAEA SG

- 2003 Meeting to Evaluate Potential Applicability of Antineutrino Detection
- 2008 Experts and Users Meeting on Antineutrino Detection for IAEA Safeguards
- Attendance at AAP2007, AAP2009




### The future of Safeguards?

- Increasing material and facilities under safeguards
- Not expected to see similar increases in resources being provided to the Dept.
- Gen III and Gen IV reactors
- Non-traditional NFC
- Involvement in disarmament verification / non-NPT treaties



# Symposium on International Safeguards

- Every 4 years
- Excellent representation from antineutrino community
- 8 abstracts submitted
- Concrete opportunity to further the profile of the technique





#### Roadmap

- Things that the community can do
  - Present a clear vision of what antineutrino detection can offer safeguards
  - Decide on individual areas of expertise
  - Offer staged pathway to implementation

- Things that the IAEA can do
  - Issue a call for proposals (SP-1)



#### **Conclusions of the Workshop**

- The meeting concluded that antineutrino detectors have unique abilities to nonintrusively monitor reactor operational status, power and fissile content in near realtime, from outside containment.
- Several detectors, built specifically for safeguards applications, have demonstrated robust, long-term measurements of these metrics in actual installations at operating power reactors, and several more demonstrations are planned.
- It was agreed that the detector design is sufficiently robust and mature as to allow a reusable module to be developed that could be adapted to specific reactors.

#### Recommendations of the Workshop

The following recommendations were made by the workshop:

- It was recommended that the IAEA consider antineutrino detection and monitoring in its current R&D program for safeguarding bulk-process reactors;
- It was recommended that the IAEA should also consider antineutrino monitoring in its Safeguards by Design approaches for power and fissile inventory monitoring of new and next generation reactors;
- It was recommended that there should be further interaction between IAEA and the antineutrino research and development (R&D) community, including regular participation of IAEA safeguards departmental staff into international meetings;
- It was recommended that IAEA safeguards departmental staff visit currently deployed and planned neutrino detection installations for safeguards applications;
- It was recommended the IAEA work with experts to consider future reactor designs, using existing simulation codes for reactor evolution and detector response.

