# Undeclared nuclear activity monitoring

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Regular reactor background Rogue activity detection Detection sensibility Localisation





2 Regular reactor background

- 3 Rogue activity detection
- 4 Detection sensibility







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Regular reactor background Rogue activity detection Detection sensibility Localisation

# Introduction



### Purpose

• Coast monitoring  $\rightarrow$  rogue activity detection





Regular reactor background Rogue activity detection Detection sensibility Localisation

# Introduction



### Purpose

- Coast monitoring  $\rightarrow$  rogue activity detection
- Rogue reactor location





Regular reactor background Rogue activity detection Detection sensibility Localisation

# Introduction



### Purpose

- Coast monitoring  $\rightarrow$  rogue activity detection
- Rogue reactor location
- Constraints : distances, detector position, regular reactor background, etc.





Antineutrino creatior Europe map Simulation

# Outline





- Antineutrino creation
- Europe map
- Simulation











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Antineutrino creation Europe map Simulation

# Regular reactor background

Antineutrino creation

### Creation rate

- 1 GW<sub>th</sub>  $\leftrightarrow$  1.9  $\times$  10<sup>20</sup>  $\overline{\nu}_{e}$ /s
- World power reactors create 2.1  $\times 10^{23} \overline{v}_e/s$

### Induced background

1 year monitoring with a  $10^{34}$  protons LS detector observes 150 events in the best case. Can rise up to a few  $10^4$  events. Non-reactor background are not accounted for.





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# Regular reactor background



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# Regular reactor background

### Data

- 192 nuclear power stations
- Standard core composition (52% <sup>235</sup>U, 34% <sup>239</sup>Pu)
- Average load factor (world mean : 0.8)

### Simulation

- Simulation code from Saclay
- Neutrino oscillation included, with standard parameters





Outline



2 Regular reactor background



### Rogue activity detection

- Assumptions
- Likelihood ratio method
- Monte Carlo simulation
- Detection criterion









Assumptions Likelihood ratio method Monte Carlo simulation Detection criterion

# Rogue activity detection

Assumptions

### Assumptions

- Rogue power P = 100 MW 2 GW (classic : 500 MW)
- Exposure time T = 1 month 2 years (classic : 3 months)
- Detector size N =  $10^{33}$  few  $10^{34}$  protons (classic :  $10^{34}$ )
- Luminosity = PTN ( $10^2 10^5$  rnu) (classic : 1250 rnu)
- Detector in an oil tanker, moving in the oceans
- Actual number of events in detector follows a Poisson law,  $\lambda$  = theoretical number of events.





Assumptions Likelihood ratio method Monte Carlo simulation Detection criterion

# Rogue activity detection

Likelihood ratio method

### Method

- Data set n, theoretical value without rogue activity b
- Fitness probability :  $p = \frac{L(b,n)}{L(b,b)}$
- L = likelihood function
- $L_{poisson}(b,n) = -b + n \times log(b) log(\Gamma(n+1))$
- We take this value to detect rogue activity presence





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Assumptions Likelihood ratio method Monte Carlo simulation Detection criterion

# Rogue activity detection

Monte Carlo simulation



FIGURE: Monte Carlo simulation of likelihood ratio. Total experiment = 3000 rnu ( $10^{34}$  protons, 300 MW), distance = 300 km, low background





Assumptions Likelihood ratio method Monte Carlo simulation Detection criterion

# Rogue activity detection

**Detection criterion** 

### Chosen arbitrary criterion

- False alarm is set to 10%
- 90% probability
- ullet  $\to$  Likelihood ratio > 90% in at least 90% cases





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Simulation Detection distance Detection law

# Outline



Regular reactor background

3 Rogue activity detection

### Detection sensibility

- Simulation
- Detection distance
- Detection law





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Simulation Detection distance Detection law

# **Detection sensibility**

Simulation

### Simulation parameters

- 1 detector in a given luminosity  $\mathcal{L}$
- Reactors randomly placed around the detector
- For each reactor, likelihood ratio method is applied
- We assume the reactor is detected when detection follows the previous criterion





Simulation Detection distance Detection law

# **Detection sensibility**

Simulation



### FIGURE: Detection sensibility for 5000 rnu luminosity.





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Simulation Detection distance Detection law

# **Detection sensibility**

**Detection distance** 





FIGURE: Detection distance for high, medium, and low background cases.



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Simulation Detection distance Detection law

## **Detection sensibility**

**Detection law** 





FIGURE: Detection distance as a function of luminosity and background level.



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Outline

## Introduction

- Regular reactor background
- 3 Rogue activity detection
- 4 Detection sensibility

- 5 Localisation
  - Principle
  - Algorithm
  - 1<sup>st</sup> example
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> example

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#### Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> exam

# Localisation

Principle

### Localisation steps

- Detectors patrol around the world. One of them detects a rogue activity.
- Several detectors move towards the area, and take data to determine a more accurate area to monitor.
- Oetectors get closer to accurately monitor the area, and give a possible location of the rogue reactor.





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# Localisation

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Principle

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# Localisation

Principle

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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation

Algorithm

### SNIF algorithm (single data set)

- SNIF maps the area with potential reactors, and reiterates around the 5 best fits of the previous mapping.
- We obtain a potential location, around which we draw confidence level contours

### Localisation

Once user is convinced there is a rogue activity, SNIF is used for first and second localisation monitoring.





Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Examples

# Examples

### Disclaimer

These examples are arbitrary examples and were chosen for their pedagogic parameters.





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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example



# Example 1 : West Africa.

- Low background
- 600 MW
- 10<sup>34</sup> protons / detector





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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation



FIGURE: Rogue activity likelihood through time. 350 km - 6000 rnu/yr





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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation 1<sup>st</sup> example - Second step









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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation 1<sup>st</sup> example - Second step

Detector	Events	BG(th)	R(th)	CL
1	233	226.26	6.52	0.11
2	257	217.59	37.93	0.97
3	232	227.19	16.89	0.06
4	228	239.68	6.75	0.23





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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation 1<sup>st</sup> example - Third step









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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation 1<sup>st</sup> example - Third step

Detector	Events	BG(th)	R(th)	CL
1	500	442.2532	32.79	0.97
2	501	440.93	51.73	0.98
3	564	454.91	112.78	1
4	512	453.92	83.86	0.97





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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example



# Example 2 : Sri Lanka.

- Medium background
- 500 MW
- 10<sup>34</sup> protons / detector





Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

## Localisation 2<sup>nd</sup> example - First step



FIGURE: Rogue activity likelihood through time. 250 km - 5000 rnu/yr



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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation 2<sup>nd</sup> example - Second step



### FIGURE: 6 months observation





Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation 2<sup>nd</sup> example - Second step

Detector	Events	BG(th)	R(th)	CL
1	329	272.75	66.39	1.0
2	364	239.57	52.52	1.0
3	433	226.34	200.61	1.0
4	304	211.79	84.90	1.0





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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation 2<sup>nd</sup> example - Third step









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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Localisation 2<sup>nd</sup> example - Third step

Detector	Events	BG(th)	R(th)	CL
1	790	468.18	340.16	1.0
2	21	424.39	364.57	1.0
3	934	439.81	574.27	1.0
4	913	499.19	424.62	1.0





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Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Outlook

- Detection distance : few 100 km for 5000 rnu
- 1 detector gives good confidence after a few months
- Localisation possible but not always accurate
- Regular reactor background influence
- We are working on detector background handling, and design





Principle Algorithm 1<sup>st</sup> example 2<sup>nd</sup> example

# Thank you for listening





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