

# Prospects of Coherent neutrino–nuclear scattering for reactor monitoring

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
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# Outline

- ▶ Neutrino coherent scattering (NCS) physics
- ▶ Fuel isotope composition monitored by NCS
- ▶ Ge detector electronic threshold
- ▶ Background
- ▶ Deployable system




# Neutrino coherent scattering




- ▶ Cross section enhanced by  $N^2$
- ▶ Detection of nucleus recoil with transfer momentum  $q \ll 1/(\text{nucleus radius}) \sim \text{tens of MeV}$  (condition of coherence)
- ▶ Recoil energy  $\leq \frac{2}{A} \left[ \frac{E_\nu}{1\text{MeV}} \right]^2 \text{ keV}$

- ▶ Reactor antineutrinos produce Ge recoils of  $< \sim 3\text{keV}$
- ▶ Quenching to  $\sim 20\%$  of the recoil energy
- ▶  $\rightarrow$  detection of ionization signal  $< \sim 600\text{eV}$



# Reactor anti- $\nu$ signal rate vs. detection threshold



- ▶ Cross-section increases with neutrino energy:  $\frac{d\sigma}{d\cos\theta} \sim E_\nu^2$

but ...there are fewer reactor neutrinos at higher energies

- ▶ Detector threshold imposes a kinematic constraint on accessible reactor antineutrino energies: to produce a recoil with energy  $E_R$ , the minimum neutrino energy is


$$E_\nu^{\min} = \sqrt{\frac{ME_R}{2}}$$

- ▶ Thus, the lower the threshold, the higher the anti- $\nu$  signal rate





# Reactor anti- $\nu$ signal vs. electronic noise




- ▶ The noise pedestal recedes faster than the signal with decreasing noise FWHM
- ▶ Goal  $\rightarrow$  electronic noise threshold  $5\sigma_n \sim 100\text{eV}$  (corresponds to  $\text{FWHM} \sim 50\text{eV}$ )

Ge detector Threshold (eV)	Signal counts / day kg at 25m from reactor core
300 (now)	0.4
200	3
100 (goal)	22



# Reactor anti- $\nu$ signal rate vs. fuel cycle burnup






- ▶ About 25% variation in total anti-NCS events during NPP fuel cycle
- ▶ Higher sensitivity to fuel composition than inverse beta (10% variation)



# Our HPGe detector



- ▶ CANBERRA BEGe
- ▶ p-type, 820g
- ▶ FWHM 147eV: mainly 1/f



# SNL-LBNL collaboration



- ▶ BEGe series noise is optimal
- ▶ Currently investigating  $1/f$  noise by testing BEGe crystal in LBNL low-mass front-end
- ▶ Parallel noise will need crystal reprocessing



# Background signals < 3keV

Primary particle	Process	Background signal
Cosmic secondary n and $\mu$ -induced n	Scattering off Ge nucleus	Ge-nucleus recoils
Cosmic secondary n and $\mu$ -induced n	Nuclei activation: $^{71}\text{Ge}$ , $^{68}\text{Ga}$ , $^{65}\text{Zn}$	Partial energy depositions from X-rays and Auger e <sup>-</sup> , internal to germanium
Cosmic primary p at sea level	Nuclei activation: $^{73}\text{As}$ , $^{68}\text{Ge}$	
Thermal n	$^{71}\text{Ge}$ activation	
$\gamma$	Natural radioactivity from detector materials	Forward-peaked Compton scattering
Solar and Geo $\nu$	Scattering off Ge nucleus	Ge-nucleus recoils
WIMP ?		




# Shielding background particles

The usual,

- ▶ Any existing overburden
- ▶ Tight muon veto
- ▶ Polyethylene neutron moderator and borated thermal neutron absorber

But also,

- ▶ Ultra-low background Lead
- ▶ Anticoincidence Compton veto
- ▶ Radioclean shield and detector materials
- ▶ Lithium-drifted n+ contact covering most Ge surface
- ▶ Shield during transportation



*Shielding for SONGS deployment*







# Measured backgrounds from other experiments: SONGS Tendon Gallery

SONGS2009: CANBERA BEGe, 440g,  
163eV\_FWHM, at 30m.w.e.

- ▶ Background counts:  $\sim 10 \text{keV}^{-1} \text{kg}^{-1} \text{d}^{-1}$ .
- ▶ Near-threshold counts:  $\sim 22 \text{keV}^{-1} \text{kg}^{-1} \text{d}^{-1}$ .
- ▶ No evidence of significant increase in neutron background at this overburden with proper shielding.
- ▶ Signal processing to reduced cosmogenic background not applied because no raw preamplifier trace were recorded, but x2–3 reduction expected (see next slide).






# Measured backgrounds from other experiments: underground mine

CoGeNT2010 data: in Soudan mine at 2,100m.w.e.

- CANBERA BEGe, 440g, 163eV FWHM
- After 3 months underground, and “microphonics” and “risetime” cuts
- Background counts:  $\sim 2 \text{keV}^{-1} \text{kg}^{-1} \text{d}^{-1}$
- Near-threshold counts:  $\sim 8 \text{keV}^{-1} \text{kg}^{-1} \text{d}^{-1}$




- ▶ Confirmed that decays from cosmogenic activation internal to Ge populate the region  $< 3 \text{keV}$ . (Use cosmogenic peaks for calibration.)
- ▶ Partial energy deposition events (from nuclei decays ) are a significant near threshold but can be efficiently rejected by “risetime” cuts.
- ▶ Natural radioactivity from materials is estimated to be negligible



# Thermal-Neutron activation

- ▶ Roughly estimate the  $\text{Ge}^{71}$  decay rate from measured thermal neutron background
- ▶ A shield with a thermal-neutron reduction  $\sim 100$  times, would bring the aboveground rate of  $\text{Ge}^{71}$  decays to 10 counts per day-kg.
- ▶ **→ Aboveground monitoring might not be possible**  
(Simulations are underway)




# Signal vs. Background

For a given measurement time (7days or 30days) and background rate, the  $3\sigma$ -confidence level sets the required electronic threshold.


- ▶ Extrapolate background below 400eV to be same as in CoGeNT2010:  $\sim 8\text{kg}^{-1}\text{day}^{-1}$  in range  $<1\text{keV}$
- ▶ Then, observation of reactor ON/OFF transition at  $3\sigma$  in 30days  $\rightarrow 175\text{eV}$  threshold ( $\sim 82\text{eVFWHM}$ )
- ▶ At  $1.64\sigma$  in 30days  $\rightarrow 210\text{eV}$  ( $\sim 94\text{eVFWHM}$ )

Maximum background events/(kg day) vs. electronic threshold



# Deployable system

- ▶ Cryogenic germanium detectors are already well known and are frequently used at nuclear reactor facilities around the world.
- ▶ Little or no safety concerns from the facility operators.
- ▶ In addition, the ability to shrink the active detector from 1 ton of scintillator material to something on the order of 10 kg of germanium would allow for much more flexibility in finding locations suitable for detector installation.
- ▶ A smaller detector will also present a smaller area for interaction with cosmic backgrounds.



# Conclusions

- ▶ Electronic noise threshold still the main barrier for NCS observation with BEGe: SNL-LBNL collaboration working on this.
- ▶ “Measured” background allow possible observation of NCS (reactor ON/OFF) at  $\sim 210\text{eV}$  of electronic threshold
- ▶ Lower threshold ( $\sim 135\text{eV}$ ) required for  $3\sigma$ -CL and more timely observation (7days) of reactor ON/OFF




# Backup slides



# How “Risetime” cuts work

- ▶ Events near the dead region will only deposit part of the energy
- ▶ But also, the induced charge in the electrodes will rise slowly because near the dead layer the electric field is weak





# Signal vs. Background

**Safeguards problem:** timely and unambiguous observation of a reactor ON/OFF transition, that could signify a fuel diversion situation

- ▶ With reactor OFF, background measurement sets the signal trigger level

$$L_T = 3\sigma_{OFF}$$

- ▶ With reactor ON, how large must the detectable signal  $N_D$  be so that the false negative are less than 0.15%?

$$N_D \geq L_T + 3\sigma_{ON}$$

