



# The ANGRA Cherenkov detector

*E. Kemp on behalf of the Neutrinos-ANGRA Project*

*AAP 2010 – Sendai - Japan*

# Talk Overview

- The Challenge
  - A surface measurement using a non-favorable technique
- The Site
  - Brief description of the ANGRA site
- The Detector
  - Conceptions
- Conclusions and perspectives

# Neutrinos-ANGRA: the challenge



STR- 361

## Final Report: Focused Workshop on Antineutrino Detection for Safeguards Applications

*SGTS-TTS*

February 2009



# Neutrinos-ANGRA: the challenge



2009-02-27

STR-361

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## 7 Future Developments for Incorporation of Antineutrino Detection Technology into Safeguards

### 7.1 Short Term Goals:

2. Demonstrate robust long term burnup monitoring of power reactors with an easily deployable detector that is acceptable to the safeguards agency and reactor operators. Among other criteria, the definition of robustness should include the ability to relocate the detector via normal commercial freight channels, without special placarding or otherwise onerous shipping requirements. Further work is needed to confirm long term monitoring capability with a robust detector such as the plastic designs (though other designs may also work, including non-toxic and high flashpoint liquid designs), while suffering little or no compromise in performance over a fuel cycle. Such a demonstration can certainly be accomplished in less than five years with suitable support from member states.



# Neutrinos-ANGRA: the challenge



## 7.2 Medium Term:

If the above near-term goals are met, it is the opinion of the workshop conferees that antineutrino detectors will have demonstrated utility in response to the stated inspector needs in some specific areas of reactor safeguards. To further expand the utility of antineutrino detectors, several useful medium term (5-8 year timeframe) R&D and safeguards analysis goals are proposed.

1. Above ground deployment. Above ground deployment will enable a wider set of operational concepts for IAEA and reactor operators, and will likely expand the base of reactors to which this technology can be applied;
2. Provide fully independent measurements of fissile content, through the use of spectral information. This will allow the IAEA to fully confirm declarations with little or no input from reactor operators, purely by analysis of the antineutrino signal;
3. Develop improved shielding and reduced detector footprint designs, to allow for more convenient deployment. Current footprints are of order 2-3 meters on each side; modest reductions in footprint would expand the general utility of antineutrino detectors. In this regard, a possible deployment scenario is envisaged where the component parts of the detector, shielding and all associated electronics are contained within a standard 12 metre ISO container, facilitating ease of movement and providing physical protection to the instrument. It should be noted that due to size and weight restrictions of ISO containers (approximately 25,000 kg net load) the

# The Neutrinos-ANGRA Project

Development of new techniques for  
nuclear monitoring





# ANGRA:

## NEUTRINOS ANGRA Project



23/09/2008

container: 1st laboratory in Angra

# Angra dos Reis nuclear plant features

- 3 PWR Reactors: 2 in operation + 1 planned

Reactor (starting date)	Thermal Power (GW)	Average Uptime	Fuel Cycle
Angra-I (1985)	2.0	83 %	~1.5 years
Angra-II (2000)	4.0 ~ 1.2 x 10 <sup>20</sup> f/s	90 %	~1.3 years
Angra-III Construction starting 2009	4.0	-	-




# Neutrinos & Non-proliferation




- ~ 438 reactors worldwide:  
The International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA is responsible to inspect nuclear installations and verify safeguards agreements
- ~200kg of Pu are produced in each PWR typical cycle (~ 1.5 year)  
~90 Pu tons/year in global scale  
IAEA verifies the pacific destination of this material.
- IAEA is the verification authority:  
Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):  
Keep track of all the Pu produced in nuclear installations !

# Monitoring nuclear reactors with antineutrinos: It is feasible

## San Onofre (USA)



## Rovno/Ukraine



Thermal power control:  
Interesting topic for Eletronuclear

$$N_{\nu} = \gamma \cdot (1 + k) \cdot P_{th}$$

Factor carrying detector features

Factor carrying fuel composition features


# Angra Site Infrastructure

## Remote control of DAQ



20' container  
next of the reactor dome

- On-line Muon flux measurements with a Cerenkov detector
- Remote DAQ trough IP's released by Eletronuclear





PC monitor @ CBPF  
in Rio de Janeiro



# Target design: external box + internal reflector

Desenho completo do detector em andamento




Studies on optimal number of PMTs:

**GEANT4** simulation of 2 MeV positrons  
on the detector centre


Target: ~ 1 ton H<sub>2</sub>O (inside reflector box) + 0.1% Gd  
viewed by 40 Hamamatsu 8" R5912 PMTs

# target assembly parts drawings (to be sent to the workshop)

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# VETO assembly studies







# GEANT4: antineutrinos expected signals

$e^+$  Prompt signal

Positrons from B.E. - Visible Energy



Thermal Neutrons - Visible Energy





Neutron capture signal

Distribution of total number of p.e. Collected in the PMTs

# GEANT4: muon background

Cosmic Muons Visible Energy




# Muon background rejection

- Cosmic muons crossing the detector = 1KHz  
→  $10^8$  muons / day
- Expected neutrino interactions rate  
~  $10^3$  / day

$$\varepsilon_{\mu} = \varepsilon_{\mu}^{\text{veto}} \times \varepsilon_{\mu}^{\text{window}} \times \varepsilon_{\mu}^{\text{threshold}} \times \varepsilon_{\mu}^{\text{direction}}$$
$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \varepsilon_{\mu}^{\text{veto}} \approx 0.1 \\ \varepsilon_{\mu}^{\text{window}} \approx 0.095 \\ \varepsilon_{\mu}^{\text{threshold}} \approx 0.05 \\ \varepsilon_{\mu}^{\text{direction}} \approx 0.01 \end{array} \right.$$

⇒  $\varepsilon_{\mu} \approx 10^{-6}$  → Final bkg rejection factor


- **Signal/Noise ratio must be reduced by a factor  $10^5$ .**
- Muon rejection techniques:
  - **External VETO:** scintillators -  $4\pi$  veto system for the target
    - Assuming 90% of efficiency → 1 order of magnitude of rejection
  - **Time window coincidence:**
    - 100 $\mu$ s of coincident pulses → muon rates fall down to 10%;
  - **Thresholds**
    - Muons signals are very high (rejection power of ~ 95%);
  - **Directionality:**
    - Muons are “downwarding” particles. PMTS should be more illuminated at the bottom by muon events. Charge balance in PMTs can help to distinguish *isotropic events*: additional ~ 1 % rejection factor







# GEANT4: neutron shielding studies

10 MeV neutron



Comparacao entre Shield Externo de Agua e Polietileno[B] com Corte em Energia (6 pe)



Flux measured @ LNGS – external room (1000 m):  $E_n > 10$  MeV

$N_{flux} = 75 \text{ n/m}^2 \cdot \text{s}$

Angra ( at the sea level ): 3x reduction factor


$N_{flux} = 25 \text{ n/m}^2 \cdot \text{s}$

Shielding attenuation  
( ~ 85% acima de 10 MeV)

$N_{flux} = 4 \text{ n/m}^2 \cdot \text{s} \rightarrow \sim 5\%$  of contamination

# Natural radioactivity 1<sup>st</sup> check: ok...



No relevant component found



# PMTs Characterization



Hamamatsu 8" R5912  
Single Photo-Electron  
Distribution






# DAQ VME


**Waveform digitizer: VME 6U standard**  
**ADC: 8 analog channels @ 125 MHz**  
**or**  
**4 analog channels @ 250 MHz**  
**Dynamic range = 2 Vpp**  
**Buffer per channel = 64k samples**  
**TDC: 8 channels for time measurements**  
**time resolution 81ps**  
**dynamic range = 9.8  $\mu$ s**  
**2 firmware versions (8 ou 4 channels)**  
**control and status registers**  
**slow control:CAN communication**

Project by CBPF, Board lay-out and assembly made at  
Campinas local company ( CADSERVICE)

- 10 unities ready – already assembled - in debbuging phase
- First real measurement tests soon...



# Front-End Electronics




CBPF

UEFS




# Development of muon VETO

64 channel Hamamatsu PMT R7546A







# MAPMT Box




Moldura para integrar MAPMT, guia de fibras ópticas claras e conector elétrico




Caixa da MAPMT: blindagem óptica e eletromagnética p/ PMT e circuitos



# Test results from MAPMT H7546A (voltage divider + pre-amplifier @ 900V) : amplitude and charge from cosmic muons crossing the VETO plastic scintillator)



Amplitude de pulsos de muons bem acima do ruído de fundo no protótipo do veto de múons



Sensibilidade do protótipo do sistema de veto de múons de 20 p.e. (p.e. = 0.5 pC)

# New Development: WLS in water / amino-G





Figura 3.40: Curva di assorbimento (A) e di emissione (B) dell'amino-G in acqua: queste curve sono sovrapposte a quella dei fotoni generati per effetto Cherenkov.



# Amino-G enhancement in the photon yield

Gain obtained adding amino-G salt



UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TORINO

FACOLTÀ DI SCIENZE MATEMATICHE, FISICHE E NATURALI  
Corso di Laurea Specialistica in Astrofisica e Fisica Cosmica

CARATTERIZZAZIONE DI UN  
RIVELATORE CHERENKOV AD  
ACQUA PER LA RICERCA DI  
GAMMA-RAY BURSTS AD ALTA  
QUOTA

Relatore:  
Prof.  
OSCAR SAAVEDRA

Candidata:  
IRENE BOLOGNINO

Correlatore:  
Dott.  
MARCO AGLIETTA

Controrelatore:  
Prof.  
PIERO GALEOTTI

# Conclusions

**ANGRA project status:**

**Neutrino Laboratory @ ANGRA is OPERATIONAL.**

**GEANT4 simulation is running and guiding final detector design.**

**Electronics is almost ready to production phase.**

**PMTs are being purchased.**

**(and workshops are almost to be**

